

Supplementary material
for
The longevity of national identity and national pride:
Evidence from wider Europe

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The Supplementary material consists of two parts. Appendix A provides a detailed description of the expert survey we conducted as well as information on the construction of the National Identity Longevity Index. Appendix B provides tables with variable definitions, descriptive statistics, and average marginal effects for individual-level variables used in the analysis reported in the paper.

Appendix A

Towards measuring the longevity of national identity: Why an expert survey?

There is a shortage of data about the timing of the spread of national identity across the world. This is driven by the difficulty of collecting historical data about national identity. There are three main challenges.

The first challenge is that such data are difficult to assemble because identities are less tangible than indicators of economic performance or political institutions. For example, it is more straightforward to establish the date when a constitution was approved in a given polity than to establish the date when a majority of a polity's residents started to think of themselves as members of a nation. Thus, especially for periods prior to the rise of modern survey research, scholars have had only indirect evidence about the diffusion of identities.

There have been scattered attempts to find tangible indicators of the historical development of nationalism. This work is important and valuable. However, as noted in the main text of the paper, none of these measures were intended by the authors to capture the extent of the diffusion of national identity in a population.

Centeno (2002), for example, focuses on the timing of the construction of different types of monuments, some understood to be 'national'. There is no theoretical reason to suggest that the timing of monument construction can be used as a proxy for the diffusion of national identity. In

fact, it is plausible that a numerically small group of nationalists with sufficient resources, even if out of step with the majority of a society's population, could construct such monuments. Centeno (2002: 179) himself observes that the monuments 'serve as an indication of what those who have enough power to construct such monuments want to remember or honor', a 'hierarchy of official memory'. Consequently, these monuments do not necessarily reflect the extent of the spread of national identity in a population. At the same time, we have little ground to expect that all polities turn to constructing national monuments after developing national identity. Finally, there may be difficulties in discerning which monuments are national and which ones are not.

Wimmer and Feinstein (2010) focus on the emergence of 'nationalist organizations', typically those seeking independence or autonomy for the group they identify as their nation. It is unlikely that these nationalist organizations reliably indicate a given state of the diffusion of national identity. Their presence likely runs the gamut from substantially lagging the widespread diffusion of national identity to getting well out in front of the population's adoption of the identity (think, for example, of organizations dedicated to the creation of an independent republic of Vermont, which clearly do not reflect widespread Vermontian national identity).

The second challenge is that historical-textual material is not available to equal extents for the range of cases with which comparative scholars of nationalism are concerned. In principle, if there were adequate searchable textual material, we might be able to trace the diffusion of national identity through large-scale content analysis of pamphlets, speeches, and periodicals, perhaps making use of automated textual analysis tools. Some polities are extraordinarily well documented (such as 17th century England, for which the Thomason tracts alone comprise more data than are available for most cases) and could usefully be studied in this way. Other polities have far less accessible documentation, however, and so at present this

method does not seem appropriate for the assembly of comparable estimates about the diffusion of national identity across numerous polities. An additional concern with such an approach would be a bias towards literate expressions of national identity. Since one of the major debates about national identity concerns its relationship with literacy, this could be especially problematic.

The third challenge is that scholars have disagreed about how to best conceptualize and define national identity. The primary debate has been between 'primordialists' and 'modernists' (Smith, 1986). The former tend to conflate national identity with collective identity more generally. The latter emphasize the distinctiveness of modern national identity, often emphasizing its incorporation of ideas about popular sovereignty and equality (Greenfeld, 1992; Anderson, 1991; Wimmer, 2012).

Because of scholarly disagreements about how to define national identity, comparative secondary sources, such as the available encyclopedias of nationalism and national identity (e.g., Motyl, 2001; Herb and Kaplan, 2008), are not reliable guides to the timing of national identity's diffusion. This is because authors of specific case studies in these sources do not share a common framework. This prevents us from taking the route outlined by Bockstette et al. (2002) in assembling their state antiquity index.

For these reasons, we believe that the knowledge of polity-level experts is the best source of information currently available concerning the timing of national identity diffusion. Therefore, we carried out an expert survey covering European and post-Soviet polities. To avoid challenge number three above, we asked each expert to provide his or her definition of national identity; we then excluded responses of experts who adopted a primordialist approach (see section Definition of national identity for more details).

We do not claim that the resulting index is perfect. Experts gave us their best available judgments about the timing of a complex phenomenon. They could, and often did, disagree, resulting in expert estimates that are sometimes more than a century apart for a given polity (see below). We tried to minimize bias in expert selection, but it is possible that some bias exists across communities of experts (e.g., historians of Germany relative to historians of France) that affects experts' estimates. Despite the caveats outlined above, we believe the index is (i) better than existing alternatives and (ii) a useful stand-in until further effort is invested to obtain even more valid and reliable measures for the timing of national identity.

Geographic focus of the expert survey

Our survey covered 48 polities in the 'wider Europe,' comprising traditional European polities as well as all post-Soviet polities (including those not traditionally understood to be 'European'). We focused on these polities for several reasons. First, scholars of nationalism have often argued that modern national identity emerged in Europe and spread across the world through a process of global diffusion (e.g., Wimmer, 2012; Greenfeld, 1992). Second, we expected such polities to be relatively well-documented and to have a large number of potential expert survey respondents available for such cases. Third, since we were focusing on European polities, which included some post-Soviet states, it made sense to include all post-Soviet polities as a group, both because of Soviet nationality policies and because other researchers (e.g., Wimmer, 2012) have found that diffusion effects of nation-states tend to happen within imperial systems, of which the Soviet system of states and satellites could be considered a variant. Finally, we expected that predicted outcomes of the longevity of national identity (e.g., contemporary national pride, institutional and economic performance, etc.) would be well-documented in these polities.

In the paper, we use data for 36 out of the 48 polities covered by the survey (see Table 1 in the paper). The 36 polities constitute the largest set of polities for which we could obtain data on the individual-level and polity-level controls utilized in our empirical analysis.

Identifying experts

Expert identification itself imposed a challenge, since there is no central registry of experts on the subject. We used several strategies to identify experts. First, we began by writing to members of several history departments in the United States, selecting those faculty members with expertise on one of the polities covered by our survey. Second, we hired consultants to help us identify experts for several sub-regions. Brian Porter-Szucs (History, University of Michigan) provided recommendations of experts for Central and Eastern Europe, Scott Radnitz (Political Science, University of Washington) for a number of the post-Soviet cases and Jelena Subotic (Political Science, Georgia State University) for polities in the Balkans and Southern Europe. Third, we used Google Scholar and examined the tables of contents for the journal *Nations and Nationalism* for a ten-year period (volume year 10 to volume year 20) to identify authors of articles and books on nationalism and national identity for polities covered by our survey. Fourth, we asked scholars who responded to the survey to nominate other experts on their polities. Finally, for the remaining cases at the end of the process we searched for experts based on an informed ad hoc basis, with the aim of identifying historians and area studies scholars who focused on the polities of our interest.

Between June 2014 and September 2015, we sent invitations via email and provided our respondents with access to a web-based survey. We sent 805 invitations in total and received 165 responses, for an overall response rate of approximately 20.5%. Potential respondents were offered the chance to win one of ten \$100 Amazon gift cards as an incentive to complete the

survey. Table A1 provides data on the number of invitations, responses, and response rates by polity. We gave respondents the option to be credited or to remain confidential. In the Acknowledgments section of this appendix, we list only those experts who indicated that they would like to be credited.

Survey questions

The first three questions of the survey focused on the historical timing of the spread of national identity at three threshold values: (1) among at least a small group within the polity, (2) among political elites, and (3) among the majority of residents of the polity. Each question had a follow-up question asking respondents to rate the level of confidence they had in the estimate. Additional questions that we asked focused on the type of national identity (civic vs. ethnic), the definition of national identity that the respondent used, and other cases of national identity (e.g., minority nationalisms) found in the polity of expertise.

For purposes of this paper, and in order to construct our National Identity Longevity Index, we draw on two questions from the expert survey. The first question is: 'Please identify the one-third century during which you believe a majority of the residents of your polity of expertise first adopted national identity.' Possible responses range from 'never' to every one-third century during the 20th, 19th, 18th, 17th, and 16th century, as well as 'prior to 16th century'. The second question we draw on is: 'How much confidence do you have in the accuracy of your estimate?' Possible responses are 'no confidence', 'reasonable confidence', and 'high level of confidence'.

Definition of national identity

We had to make coding decisions when analyzing experts' responses. In the initial stages of the survey, we imposed a strict definition of national identity, drawing on the modernist definitions

of Greenfeld (1992) and Anderson (1991[1983]). However, a number of potential respondents indicated discomfort with being provided a strict definition. To tackle that issue and concerns about the length of the original survey, we revised our survey and launched a shortened version used for eliciting all remaining expert responses (16 respondents completed the long survey; 149 respondents completed the shorter survey). In the shortened version of the survey, and thus for the majority of the respondents, we did not impose a definition of national identity. Instead, we asked respondents to date the development of national identity with respect to our three thresholds and to provide the definition of national identity they used when doing so. One consequence of this revised approach was that we received some responses that were clearly given by 'primordialists' (those respondents who see national identity as a phenomenon present in most times and places (see Smith (1986), as discussed above)). Conceptualizing and defining national identity from this point of view, although valid, diverges from the focus of our study, which employs a modernist conception of national identity to study its effect on national pride. We adopt a modernist perspective because modernist view of national identity is the dominant view among scholars of nationalism and because contemporary national pride, the outcome of our interest, is most likely impacted by national identity defined from a modernist perspective.

For this reason, we excluded from the construction of our index the responses submitted by experts who adopted a non-modernist perspective. To identify those responses, three project staff members independently examined the definitions provided by respondents and highlighted those that seemed to be non-modernist. In many cases, the decision on whether to include or exclude a response was straightforward in that many respondents would explicitly state that they relied on a specific definition of national identity (e.g., by Anderson (1991) or by Gellner (1983)), thereby clearly signaling their modernist or non-modernist perspective. In other cases, a

bit more judgment was required. If an expert offered a definition but their definition was unclear, staff looked at open-ended responses to other questions we asked in the survey for information about whether respondents viewed nationalism and national identity through a primordialist or modernist lens. There was considerable overlap in our judgments about the perspective of the responses. In those relatively few cases where our views diverged, we carefully read all relevant responses, communicated and jointly made a decision on whether the perspective was modernist or not. We only excluded responses when we felt quite confident that the perspective was a non-modernist one or when answers were so vague that it was impossible to make a judgment. We describe these cases in detail in the Expert responses by polity section below.

In addition, we excluded two responses (one for Slovenia and one for Iceland) for which the experts did not answer the definition question and one response (for Spain) that clearly was focused not on the main case of national identity in a polity but exclusively on peripheral or regional nationalisms. Altogether, we eliminated 18 responses, leaving us with 147 total responses for 48 countries. For the analysis in paper, we use 119 responses for 36 countries.

Expert responses by polity

The following section provides a detailed description of all expert responses by polity as well as our comments when a decision was made to exclude a specific response. Each country's table of experts' responses contains five columns: column 1: Expert; column 2: Country; column 3: Expert response; column 4: Expert confidence in response; column 5: Flags responses that have been excluded.

Albania: 2 respondents.

Expert 1	Albania	Prior to 16th century	High confidence	Excluded
Expert 2	Albania	Middle 1/3 of the 20th century	Reasonable confidence	

We excluded one response based on answers to the open ended questions. The answer to the definition question was ambiguous, reading '1. Political elite 2. Religious orientation 3. Territorial Claims'. The response to the question 'What else, if anything, do you think we ought to know about the historical timing of national identity's spread in your polity of expertise?' focused on 'the Middle Ages' as 'the period in which the national identities were expressed in its purest form', clearly indicating a primordialist perspective.

Armenia: 3 respondents.

Expert 1	Armenia	First 1/3 of 20th century	High confidence	
Expert 2	Armenia	Last 1/3 of 18th century	Reasonable confidence	
Expert 3	Armenia	Prior to 16th century	High confidence	Excluded

We excluded one response based on the answer to the definition question, which reported that 'Armenians developed national identity very precociously, perhaps in the VI-VIII centuries AD, due to the adoption of a peculiar brand of their own Christianity with its own alphabet'. This definition clearly indicated a primordialist perspective.

Austria: 5 respondents.

Expert 1	Austria	Middle 1/3 of 19th century	Reasonable confidence	
Expert 2	Austria	Final 1/3 of 20th century	High confidence	
Expert 3	Austria	Final 1/3 of 20th century	High confidence	
Expert 4	Austria	Last 1/3 of 18th century	Reasonable confidence	
Expert 5	Austria	First 1/3 of 20th century	High confidence	

Azerbaijan: 2 respondents.

Expert 1	Azerbaijan	Middle 1/3 of 20th century	Reasonable confidence	
Expert 2	Azerbaijan	Middle 1/3 of 20th century	Reasonable confidence	

Belarus: 4 respondents.

Expert 1	Belarus	Never	Reasonable confidence	
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Expert 2	Belarus	Middle 1/3 of 20th century	High confidence
Expert 3	Belarus	Middle 1/3 of 20th century	High confidence
Expert 4	Belarus	Final 1/3 of 20th century	Reasonable confidence

Belgium: 3 respondents.

Expert 1	Belgium	Middle 1/3 of 19th century	Reasonable confidence
Expert 2	Belgium	First 1/3 of 20th century	Reasonable confidence
Expert 3	Belgium	Never	Reasonable confidence

Bosnia and Herzegovina: 3 respondents.

Expert 1	Bosnia - Herzegovina	Final 1/3 of 20th century	Reasonable confidence
Expert 2	Bosnia - Herzegovina	Prior to 16th century	High confidence Excluded
Expert 3	Bosnia - Herzegovina	Never	High confidence

We excluded one response based on the answer to the definition question and other open-ended questions, which showed a primordialist perspective. The answer to the definition question focused on 'the existence of the Bogomils and the medieval church' while the response to the question 'What else, if anything, do you think we ought to know about the historical timing of national identity's spread in your polity of expertise?' also began by focusing on 'the national identity which developed from the Bogomils'.

Bulgaria: 4 respondents.

Expert 1	Bulgaria	Middle 1/3 of 19th century	High confidence
Expert 2	Bulgaria	Middle 1/3 of 19th century	High confidence
Expert 3	Bulgaria	Final 1/3 of 19th century	Reasonable confidence
Expert 4	Bulgaria	Final 1/3 of 19th century	Reasonable confidence

Croatia: 5 respondents.

Expert 1	Croatia	Middle 1/3 of 19th century	Reasonable confidence
Expert 2	Croatia	Prior to 16th century	Reasonable confidence Excluded
Expert 3	Croatia	First 1/3 of 20th century	High confidence

Expert 4	Croatia	Middle 1/3 of 19th century	High confidence
Expert 5	Croatia	First 1/3 of 20th century	High confidence

We excluded one response based on responses to open-ended questions indicating a primordialist approach. The respondent's definition of national identity stated 'National self-awareness among ordinary people, use of own language in important institutions'. This is ambiguous, since it depends on what 'national self-awareness' means. It was clear from another response that this was understood in a primordialist sense. When asked 'What else, if anything, do you think we ought to know about the historical timing of national identity's spread in your polity of expertise?', the respondent began by noting that 'Croats had their own king under feudalism and celebrated mass in their own language at the time of the Crusades' and going on to make reference to medieval Croatian parliaments.

Czech Republic: 3 respondents.

Expert 1	Czech Republic	Final 1/3 of 19th century	Reasonable confidence
Expert 2	Czech Republic	Final 1/3 of 19th century	High confidence
Expert 3	Czech Republic	Middle 1/3 of the 20th century	High confidence

Denmark: 3 respondents.

Expert 1	Denmark	First 1/3 of 19th century	High confidence
Expert 2	Denmark	Final 1/3 of 19th century	High confidence
Expert 3	Denmark	First 1/3 of 20th century	Reasonable confidence

Estonia: 3 respondents.

Expert 1	Estonia	Middle 1/3 of 20th century	High confidence
Expert 2	Estonia	Middle 1/3 of 20th century	Low confidence
Expert 3	Estonia	Final 1/3 of 19th century	High confidence

Finland: 4 respondents.

Expert 1	Finland	Middle 1/3 of 19th century	Reasonable confidence
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Expert 2	Finland	Middle 1/3 of 19th century	High confidence
Expert 3	Finland	First 1/3 of 20th century	Reasonable confidence
Expert 4	Finland	Middle 1/3 of 20th century	Reasonable confidence

France: 4 respondents.

Expert 1	France	Final 1/3 of 20th century	High confidence
Expert 2	France	First 1/3 of 19th century	Reasonable confidence
Expert 3	France	Last 1/3 of the 19th century	High confidence
Expert 4	France	Last 1/3 of 18th century	Reasonable confidence

Georgia: 2 respondents.

Expert 1	Georgia	First 1/3 of 20th century	Reasonable confidence
Expert 2	Georgia	Prior to 16th century	Reasonable confidence Excluded

We excluded one response, based on the answer to the definition question, which explicitly stated that 'I did not mean national identity in [the] modern sense' and focused on 'medieval Georgia of [the] 10th century'.

Germany: 3 respondents.

Expert 1	Germany	Last 1/3 of 18th century	High confidence
Expert 2	Germany	Final 1/3 of 19th century	High confidence
Expert 3	Germany	Final 1/3 of 19th century	Reasonable confidence

Great Britain: 3 respondents.

Expert 1	Great Britain	N.A.	N.A.	Excluded
Expert 2	Great Britain	First 1/3 of 18th century	Reasonable confidence	
Expert 3	Great Britain	Middle 1/3 of 18th century	Reasonable confidence	

We excluded one response because the respondent did not answer the question regarding timing of the spread of national identity among the general population.

Greece: 6 respondents.

Expert 1	Greece	First 1/3 of 19th century	Reasonable confidence
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Expert 2	Greece	Last 1/3 of 18th century	High confidence
Expert 3	Greece	Final 1/3 of 19th century	Reasonable confidence
Expert 4	Greece	First 1/3 of 19th century	Reasonable confidence
Expert 5	Greece	Final 1/3 of 19th century	Reasonable confidence
Expert 6	Greece	Middle 1/3 of 19th century	Reasonable confidence

Hungary: 4 respondents.

Expert 1	Hungary	Final 1/3 of 19th century	Reasonable confidence
Expert 2	Hungary	Middle 1/3 of 19th century	Reasonable confidence
Expert 3	Hungary	Middle 1/3 of 19th century	High confidence Excluded
Expert 4	Hungary	First 1/3 of the 20th century	Low confidence

We excluded one response based on the answer to the definition question, which read 'Acting on the basis of a belief being a member of a polity (broader than a local community and not a church), e.g., being subject of a king, being a member of the estates of the kingdom, nowadays being a citizen'. Most modernist scholars (e.g., Greenfeld, 1992; Anderson, 1991) would see estate identity as distinct from and opposed to modern national identity.

Iceland: 3 respondents.

Expert 1	Iceland	Middle 1/3 of 19th century	High confidence Excluded
Expert 2	Iceland	Prior to 16th century	High confidence Excluded
Expert 3	Iceland	Final 1/3 of 20th century	Reasonable confidence

We excluded two expert responses. One gave no answer to the definition question or any of the other open-ended questions. In the section Robustness checks and alternative model specifications, we include this response in the calculation of the index. The second excluded response was excluded because of responses to open-ended questions indicating a primordialist perspective. The response to the definition question was ambiguous ('Sense of belonging to a self-governing group of people with shared (but varied) origins, shared land, shared (but

originally varied) religion, shared history and shared language.') However, in the response to the question 'What else, if anything, do you think we ought to know about the historical timing of national identity's spread in your polity of expertise?' the respondent noted that 'It is clear from the textual corpus from the very beginning of known writing in the 12th and 13th centuries that there is a shared notion of belonging together among the people living in the country', clearly indicating a primordialist perspective.

Ireland: 4 respondents.

Expert 1	Ireland	First 1/3 of 17th century	Reasonable confidence
Expert 2	Ireland	Middle 1/3 of 19th century	Reasonable confidence
Expert 3	Ireland	First 1/3 of the 20th century	High confidence
Expert 4	Ireland	Prior to 16th century	Reasonable confidence Excluded

We excluded one response that included a very complex answer to the definition question. This respondent drew a distinction between national identities and those that had 'become nationalist', noting that 'national distinctions became nationalist in the 19th century'. However, he or she seemed to mean by national identity 'a generalized notion of being Irish' which developed 'prior to the 16th century'.

Italy: 4 respondents.

Expert 1	Italy	Middle 1/3 of 20th century	Reasonable confidence
Expert 2	Italy	Final 1/3 of 19th century	High confidence
Expert 3	Italy	First 1/3 of 19th century	High confidence
Expert 4	Italy	First 1/3 of the 20th century	Reasonable confidence

Kazakhstan: 3 respondents.

Expert 1	Kazakhstan	Middle 1/3 of 20th century	Reasonable confidence
Expert 2	Kazakhstan	First 1/3 of 20th century	High confidence
Expert 3	Kazakhstan	Final 1/3 of 20th century	Reasonable confidence

Kosovo: 3 respondents.

Expert 1	Kosovo	Middle 1/3 of 20th century	High confidence
Expert 2	Kosovo	First 1/3 of 20th century	Reasonable confidence
Expert 3	Kosovo	Middle 1/3 of 20th century	High confidence

Kyrgyzstan: 4 respondents.

Expert 1	Kyrgyzstan	First 1/3 of 20th century	High confidence
Expert 2	Kyrgyzstan	Middle 1/3 of 20th century	High confidence
Expert 3	Kyrgyzstan	Middle 1/3 of 20th century	High confidence
Expert 4	Kyrgyzstan	Middle 1/3 of 19th century	Reasonable confidence

Latvia: 5 respondents.

Expert 1	Latvia	Final 1/3 of 19th century	High confidence
Expert 2	Latvia	First 1/3 of 20th century	High confidence
Expert 3	Latvia	First 1/3 of 20th century	Reasonable confidence
Expert 4	Latvia	Final 1/3 of 19th century	Reasonable confidence
Expert 5	Latvia	Middle 1/3 of 20th century	High confidence

Lithuania: 5 respondents.

Expert 1	Lithuania	First 1/3 of 20th century	High confidence
Expert 2	Lithuania	Middle 1/3 of 20th century	Reasonable confidence
Expert 3	Lithuania	First 1/3 of 20th century	Reasonable confidence
Expert 4	Lithuania	First 1/3 of 20th century	High confidence
Expert 5	Lithuania	First 1/3 of 20th century	Reasonable confidence

Luxembourg: 1 respondent.

Expert 1	Luxembourg	Middle 1/3 of 20th century	High confidence
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FYR of Macedonia: 3 respondents.

Expert 1	Macedonia	First 1/3 of 20th century	High confidence
Expert 2	Macedonia	Middle 1/3 of 20th century	Reasonable confidence

Expert 3 Macedonia Middle 1/3 of 20th century High confidence

Moldova: 3 respondents.

Expert 1 Moldova Final 1/3 of 20th century High confidence

Expert 2 Moldova Final 1/3 of 20th century Reasonable confidence

Expert 3 Moldova First 1/3 of 20th century High confidence

Montenegro: 2 respondents.

Expert 1 Montenegro Final 1/3 of 20th century High confidence

Expert 2 Montenegro Final 1/3 of 20th century High confidence

Netherlands: 5 respondents.

Expert 1 Netherlands Last 1/3 of 17th century Reasonable confidence

Expert 2 Netherlands Final 1/3 of 19th century High confidence

Expert 3 Netherlands Final 1/3 of 20th century Reasonable confidence

Expert 4 Netherlands First 1/3 of 19th century Reasonable confidence

Expert 5 Netherlands Middle 1/3 of 17th century Reasonable confidence

Norway: 1 respondent.

Expert 1 Norway First 1/3 of 19th century Reasonable confidence

Poland: 3 respondents:

Expert 1 Poland Final 1/3 of 19th century Reasonable confidence

Expert 2 Poland Middle 1/3 of 20th century Reasonable confidence

Expert 3 Poland Middle 1/3 of 19th century Reasonable confidence

Portugal: 4 respondents:

Expert 1 Portugal Final 1/3 of 19th century High confidence

Expert 2 Portugal Prior to 16th century High confidence

Expert 3 Portugal Prior to 16th century High confidence

Expert 4 Portugal Prior to 16th century Reasonable confidence Excluded

We excluded one response based on the answer to the definition question, which said 'Awareness of living in a common political space, creation of a Christian kingdom that fought against "Moorish" presence; differentiation from neighboring Spain.'

Romania: 3 respondents:

Expert 1	Romania	Final 1/3 of 19th century	High confidence
Expert 2	Romania	Final 1/3 of 19th century	Reasonable confidence
Expert 3	Romania	Final 1/3 of 19th century	High confidence

Russia: 4 respondents.

Expert 1	Russia	Middle 1/3 of 20th century	High confidence
Expert 2	Russia	Middle 1/3 of 20th century	Reasonable confidence
Expert 3	Russia	Last 1/3 of the 20th century	High confidence
Expert 4	Russia	First 1/3 of 20th century	Reasonable confidence

Serbia: 3 respondents.

Expert 1	Serbia	Prior to 16th century	High confidence
Expert 2	Serbia	Middle 1/3 of 19th century	High confidence
Expert 3	Serbia	First 1/3 of 19th century	Reasonable confidence Excluded

We excluded one response based on answers to open-ended questions that indicated a primordialist perspective on nationalism. While the definition of national identity was ambiguous ('An awareness of distinctiveness of your national group from neighbors and others. Some desire for self-determination and self-government, as well as cultural independence.'), in responding to the question 'What else, if anything, do you think we ought to know about the historical timing of national identity's spread in your polity of expertise?', the respondent wrote 'As with many Balkan ethnic groups, it is difficult to clearly pin point either their arrival to the Balkans (most scholars place the Serbs in the Balkans around the 6th century) and also their differentiation from other groups. The Serbian case is perhaps a bit easier since there is evidence of clear Serbian

national and political self-understanding in the form of independent medieval statehood.' This makes clear that a non-modernist definition of the nation is being employed.

Slovakia: 4 respondents.

Expert 1	Slovakia	First 1/3 of 20th century	High confidence
Expert 2	Slovakia	Middle 1/3 of 20th century	High confidence
Expert 3	Slovakia	Middle 1/3 of 20th century	Reasonable confidence
Expert 4	Slovakia	Final 1/3 of 19th century	Reasonable confidence

Slovenia: 3 respondents.

Expert 1	Slovenia	N.A.	N.A.	Excluded
Expert 2	Slovenia	Final 1/3 of 19th century	High confidence	Excluded
Expert 3	Slovenia	First 1/3 of 19th century	Low confidence	

We excluded two responses. One response was excluded because the expert did not provide a response to the timing of the spread of national identity among the general population. The other excluded response came from an expert who did not answer the definition question or any of the other open-ended questions, so we simply could not assess his or her definition. In the section Robustness checks and alternative model specifications, we include this second response in the calculation of the index.

Spain: 5 respondents.

Expert 1	Spain	First 1/3 of 19th century	Reasonable confidence	
Expert 2	Spain	Middle 1/3 of 19th century	Reasonable confidence	
Expert 3	Spain	First 1/3 of 19th century	Reasonable confidence	
Expert 4	Spain	First 1/3 of 20th century	High confidence	Excluded
Expert 5	Spain	Final 1/3 of 19th century	Reasonable confidence	

We excluded one response based on the answer to the definition question, which read 'To have a historical, cultural and linguistic identity which differentiates the collectivity from other

collectivities living in the same state'. This seemed to indicate to us that the respondent was focusing exclusively on Basque and/or Catalan identities, rather than the historical development of national identity in the overarching (Spanish) polity, the focus of our study.

Sweden: 5 respondents.

Expert 1	Sweden	First 1/3 of 19th century	High confidence	Excluded
Expert 2	Sweden	Final 1/3 of 19th century	Reasonable confidence	
Expert 3	Sweden	Last 1/3 of 16th century	Reasonable confidence	Excluded
Expert 4	Sweden	First 1/3 of the 20th century	Reasonable confidence	
Expert 5	Sweden	First 1/3 of 20th century	High confidence	

We excluded two responses based on the definition. The first of these simply read 'subjective identification'. The second excluded response listed as the definition the ambiguous 'A sense of belonging to a specific polity called "Sweden"'. Then, in response to the question 'What else, if anything, do you think we ought to know about the historical timing of national identity's spread in your polity of expertise?' the respondent wrote about early 16th century 'efforts to make Sweden a single Lutheran realm' by Gustav Vasa, as well as 'Gustav II Adolf's creation of a standing army in the late 16th century which helped to convince the people to think of themselves as Swedes'.

Switzerland: 5 respondents.

Expert 1	Switzerland	Final 1/3 of 19th century	Reasonable confidence	
Expert 2	Switzerland	First 1/3 of 20th century	Reasonable confidence	
Expert 3	Switzerland	Final 1/3 of 19th century	High confidence	
Expert 4	Switzerland	Final 1/3 of 19th century	Reasonable confidence	
Expert 5	Switzerland	Middle 1/3 of 19th century	Low confidence	

Tajikistan: 1 respondent.

Expert 1	Tajikistan	Middle 1/3 of 20th century	Reasonable confidence	
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Turkey: 3 respondents.

Expert 1	Turkey	Middle 1/3 of 20th century	High confidence
Expert 2	Turkey	First 1/3 of 20th century	High confidence
Expert 3	Turkey	Middle 1/3 of 20th century	High confidence

Turkmenistan: 2 respondents.

Expert 1	Turkmenistan	First 1/3 of 20th century	High confidence	Excluded
Expert 2	Turkmenistan	Final 1/3 of 20th century	High confidence	

We excluded one response, based on the answer to the definition question. The respondent offered as a definition 'Sense of belonging to a specific ethnic group, in this case the Turkmens'.

This indicates a primordialist definition.

Ukraine: 4 respondents.

Expert 1	Ukraine	First 1/3 of 20th century	Reasonable confidence
Expert 2	Ukraine	First 1/3 of 20th century	Reasonable confidence
Expert 3	Ukraine	Final 1/3 of 20th century	High confidence
Expert 4	Ukraine	First 1/3 of 20th century	High confidence

Uzbekistan: 4 respondents

Expert 1	Uzbekistan	First 1/3 of 20th century	High confidence
Expert 2	Uzbekistan	Final 1/3 of 20th century	Reasonable confidence
Expert 3	Uzbekistan	Middle 1/3 of 20th century	Reasonable confidence
Expert 4	Uzbekistan	Middle 1/3 of 20th century	High confidence

Constructing the National Identity Longevity Index

To construct our index of the longevity of national identity we proceeded as follows. First, for each expert's response to the question 'Please identify the one-third century during which you believe a majority of the residents of your polity of expertise first adopted national identity', we assigned one point for every one-third century since the passing of that threshold.

Second, we discounted the influence of the past at every one-third century. Following Bockstette et al. (2002), we used the following discount rates: 0%, 0.1%, 1%, 5%, and 10%. For example, if an expert response stated that the majority of residents first adopted national identity in the first 1/3 of the 20th century, that response translated into four one-third centuries and consequently, when using the 5% discount rate, in a discounted value of the expert-specific sub-index equal to $1+1\times(1+0.05)^{-1}+1\times(1+0.05)^{-2}+1\times(1+0.05)^{-3}=3.72$.

Third, for most polities in our sample, even after excluding responses based on primordialist definitions (see section Expert responses by polity), we have multiple expert responses. Often, the experts' responses match. Sometimes, however, they do not, which should not be surprising given the complexity of the historical unfolding of national identity across polities. We therefore used the expert's responses to the question 'How much confidence do you have in the accuracy of your estimate?' to compute a weighted average, with experts' confidence levels serving as weights, of the above-described discounted expert-specific sub-indices for each polity. The response 'no confidence' was assigned the weight of 1, 'reasonable confidence' the weight of 2, and 'high level of confidence' the weight of 3. The resulting versions of the National Identity Longevity Index, one for each discount rate, are reported in Table A2.

Finally, for purpose of empirical analysis and for ease of interpretation, we also computed the normalized value of the National Identity Longevity Index. To this end, we divided the above-described index (weighted average of the above-described discounted expert-specific sub-indices) by its maximum possible value (in our sample, the value for Portugal). Hence, our normalized country-level index of the longevity of national identity ranges between 0 (no history of national identity) and 1 (longevity of national identity for Portugal, our maximum). The

resulting normalized versions of the Longevity of National Identity Index, one for each discount rate, are reported in Table A3.

Table 1 in the paper provides the values of the normalized version of the National Identity Longevity Index using 5% discount rate for 36 out of the 48 countries covered by our expert survey.

Assessing the plausibility of the index

How accurate are the estimates of the longevity of national identity based on our index? There is, of course, no straightforward way to fully corroborate expert estimates with alternative data: if there were, we would turn to those data for our analyses. To provide a first examination of the plausibility of the estimates implied by our index, we therefore conducted an illustrative comparison of the values of our index for a set of three polities from three distinct regions covered by our sample with secondary source coverage on the emergence of national identities for these respective polities.

Our choice of secondary source coverage is Alexander Motyl's *Encyclopedia of Nationalism*, a multi-authored work that includes entries for many cases as well as about a variety of themes in the study of nationalism and national identity. It should be recalled that the entries in the *Encyclopedia of Nationalism* (and secondary sources on the subject more generally) do not rest on population surveys that would allow precise estimates of the timing of emerge and the diffusion of national identity. In essence, all historical judgments about the timing of the spread of national identity in all sources should be treated as inherently uncertain estimates. Moreover, the dates at which national identity had spread to the majority of a polity's population cannot be extracted or inferred from the *Encyclopedia of Nationalism* entries, which provide no such specific dates. What we do here, instead, is examine whether general narratives

about the history of nationalism in chosen polities are broadly consistent with the estimates implied by our index.

Our first example is Hungary. The non-discounted, non-normalized value of the National Identity Longevity Index for Hungary is 5.2 (see Table A2), which is tantamount to the estimate that the majority of the polity's members have had national identity after the middle of the 19th century. Based on what the secondary sources indicate, this is a plausible estimate. The entry in the *Encyclopedia of Nationalism* (Motyl, 2001: 221) on Hungarian nationalism reports that 'nationalist ideology was introduced into Hungarian intellectual circles by the early 19th century' and 'eventually overwhelmed the resistance of the nobility and led to the war of Hungarian independence of 1848-1849'. The entry also cites the 'passage of the 1868 Nationalities Act' that 'introduced a period of Magyarization that eventually involved forced linguistic and ethnic assimilation of minority populations, though there was significant voluntary assimilation in the urban areas' (Motyl, 2001: 221).

Our second example is Denmark. The non-discounted, non-normalized value of the National Identity Longevity Index for Denmark is 5.5 (see Table A2). In other words, the estimate implies that the majority of residents first adopted national identity in the middle of the 19th century. Again, this estimate appears to be reasonable. The entry on Danish nationalism in the *Encyclopedia of Nationalism* (Motyl, 2001: 115-116) does not pinpoint the timing of the development of national identity among a majority of the society's members. It does, however, indicate the longstanding conflict between Danish and German populations and the fear of German dominance going back centuries, but becoming a key issue in the middle of the 19th century. From 1864, according to the entry (Motyl, 2001: 116), after the loss of predominantly German territories, 'the need to strengthen the sense of Danishness from within the remaining

parts of the kingdom, as a counter against further losses to the south, was an immediate concern'. The entry further treats 'the cultural creation of identity for Denmark' as a process carried out via 'periodic newspapers, hymns, clubs, and in the folk high school movement' of the 19th century (Motyl, 2001: 116). This suggests that widespread adoption of national identity in Denmark indeed took place in the middle of the 19th century indeed.

Our third example is Turkmenistan. The non-discounted, non-normalized value of the National Identity Longevity Index for Turkmenistan is 4 (see Table A2). The estimate implies that the majority of residents first adopted national identity in the first one-third of the 20th century. This is quite consistent with the entry on Turkmenistani nationalism in the *Encyclopedia of Nationalism*. According to this entry (Motyl, 2001: 551), there were 'tribes' of Turkmen extending back into the medieval era, but it was only after the Stalinist period 'with the emergence of mass literacy and the new intelligentsia, and a relaxation of the repression [that] modern Turkmenistani nationalism began to emerge'.

In sum, our preliminary, small-scale analysis suggests that the estimates of the longevity of national identity based on our National Identity Longevity Index are broadly consistent with historical narratives about the timing of emergence of national identity. We leave it to future work to further evaluate and refine our approach.

Table A1: Invitations, responses, and response rates by polity

Polity	Invitations	Responses	Response Rate
Albania	13	2	0.154
Armenia	9	3	0.333
Austria	19	5	0.263
Azerbaijan	13	2	0.154
Belarus	17	4	0.235
Belgium	20	3	0.150
Bosnia and Herzegovina	13	3	0.231
Bulgaria	15	4	0.267
Croatia	18	5	0.278
Czech Republic	16	3	0.188
Denmark	17	3	0.176
Estonia	14	3	0.214
Finland	21	4	0.190
France	28	4	0.143
Georgia	19	2	0.105
Germany	40	3	0.075
Great Britain	27	3	0.111
Greece	16	6	0.375
Hungary	22	4	0.182
Iceland	7	3	0.429
Ireland	16	4	0.250
Italy	22	4	0.182
Kazakhstan	14	3	0.214
Kosovo	9	3	0.333
Kyrgyzstan	14	4	0.286
Latvia	19	5	0.263
Lithuania	22	5	0.227
Luxembourg	1	1	1.000
FYR of Macedonia	13	3	0.231
Moldova	10	3	0.300
Montenegro	4	2	0.500
Netherlands	12	5	0.417
Norway	19	1	0.053
Poland	21	3	0.143
Portugal	26	4	0.154
Romania	16	3	0.188
Russia	43	4	0.093
Serbia	12	3	0.250
Slovakia	15	5	0.333
Slovenia	11	3	0.273
Spain	20	5	0.250
Sweden	13	5	0.385
Switzerland	22	5	0.227
Tajikistan	7	1	0.143
Turkey	25	3	0.120
Turkmenistan	6	2	0.333
Ukraine	21	3	0.143
Uzbekistan	8	4	0.500
Total	805	165	0.205

Table A2: Values of the National Identity Longevity Index, non-normalized

Polity	National Identity Longevity Index 0% discount rate	National Identity Longevity Index 0.1% discount rate	National Identity Longevity Index 1% discount rate	National Identity Longevity Index 5% discount rate	National Identity Longevity Index 10% discount rate
Albania	3.00	3.00	2.97	2.86	2.74
Armenia	5.60	5.59	5.46	4.95	4.44
Azerbaijan	3.00	3.00	2.97	2.86	2.74
Austria	4.00	3.99	3.92	3.62	3.32
Belgium	3.33	3.33	3.26	3.02	2.76
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.78	0.76
Bulgaria	5.60	5.59	5.47	5.02	4.54
Belarus	2.20	2.20	2.18	2.11	2.02
Croatia	5.00	4.90	4.81	4.45	4.08
Czech Republic	4.25	4.24	4.18	3.91	3.63
Denmark	5.50	5.49	5.37	4.91	4.44
Estonia	3.86	3.85	3.80	3.58	3.35
Finland	4.90	4.88	4.79	4.42	4.04
France	5.10	5.09	4.97	4.52	4.07
Georgia	4.00	3.99	3.94	3.72	3.49
Germany	6.13	6.11	5.96	5.39	4.81
Greece	6.46	6.44	6.28	5.65	5.02
Hungary	5.20	5.19	5.09	4.69	4.29
Iceland	2.00	2.00	1.99	1.95	1.91
Ireland	7.14	7.11	6.86	5.94	5.10
Italy	5.00	4.99	4.89	4.50	4.10
Kazakhstan	3.14	3.14	3.11	2.97	2.82
Kosovo	3.25	3.25	3.21	3.08	2.92
Kyrgyzstan	3.82	3.81	3.76	3.54	3.31
Latvia	4.15	4.15	4.09	3.84	3.58
Lithuania	3.83	3.82	3.78	3.58	3.36
Luxembourg	3.00	3.00	2.97	2.86	2.74
FYR of Macedonia	3.38	3.37	3.33	3.18	3.02
Moldova	2.75	2.75	2.72	2.62	2.50
Montenegro	2.00	2.00	1.99	1.95	1.91
Netherlands	7.18	7.15	6.90	5.98	5.12
Norway	7.00	6.98	6.80	6.08	5.36
Poland	4.67	4.66	4.58	4.25	3.90
Portugal	13.73	12.90	12.11	9.41	7.27
Romania	5.00	4.99	4.90	4.55	4.17
Russia	2.90	2.90	2.87	2.76	2.64
Serbia	6.40	6.38	6.23	5.63	5.02
Slovakia	3.70	3.69	3.65	3.46	3.25
Slovenia	7.00	6.98	6.80	6.08	5.36
Spain	6.25	6.23	6.09	5.51	4.92
Sweden	4.30	4.28	4.22	3.96	3.68
Switzerland	4.90	4.89	4.81	4.46	4.10
Tajikistan	3.00	3.00	2.97	2.86	2.74
Turkey	3.50	3.50	3.46	3.29	3.11
Turkmenistan	4.00	3.99	3.94	3.72	3.49
Ukraine	3.40	3.40	3.36	3.19	3.01
Great Britain	9.50	9.46	9.11	7.79	6.55
Uzbekistan	3.10	3.10	3.07	2.94	2.80
Iceland*	4.40	4.39	4.31	3.97	3.64
Slovenia*	5.50	5.49	5.38	4.93	4.47

Notes: The table presents the values for the (non-normalized) National Identity Longevity Index for different discount rates. * indicates alternative coding of the National Identity Longevity Index when responses of two experts (for Iceland and Slovenia) who did not elaborate on their definition of national identity (see section Expert responses by polity) are included in the calculation of the value of the index.

Table A3: Values of the National Identity Longevity Index, normalized

Polity	National Identity Longevity Index 0% discount rate	National Identity Longevity Index 0.1% discount rate	National Identity Longevity Index 1% discount rate	National Identity Longevity Index 5% discount rate	National Identity Longevity Index 10% discount rate
Albania	0.22	0.23	0.25	0.30	0.38
Armenia	0.41	0.43	0.45	0.53	0.61
Azerbaijan	0.22	0.23	0.25	0.30	0.38
Austria	0.29	0.31	0.32	0.38	0.46
Belgium	0.24	0.26	0.27	0.32	0.38
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.08	0.10
Bulgaria	0.41	0.43	0.45	0.53	0.62
Belarus	0.16	0.17	0.18	0.22	0.28
Croatia	0.36	0.38	0.40	0.47	0.56
Czech Republic	0.31	0.33	0.35	0.42	0.50
Denmark	0.40	0.43	0.44	0.52	0.61
Estonia	0.28	0.30	0.31	0.38	0.46
Finland	0.36	0.38	0.40	0.47	0.56
France	0.37	0.39	0.41	0.48	0.56
Georgia	0.29	0.31	0.33	0.40	0.48
Germany	0.45	0.47	0.49	0.57	0.66
Great Britain	0.69	0.73	0.75	0.83	0.90
Greece	0.47	0.50	0.52	0.60	0.69
Hungary	0.38	0.40	0.42	0.50	0.59
Iceland	0.15	0.16	0.16	0.21	0.26
Ireland	0.52	0.55	0.57	0.63	0.70
Italy	0.36	0.39	0.40	0.48	0.56
Kazakhstan	0.23	0.24	0.26	0.32	0.39
Kosovo	0.24	0.25	0.27	0.33	0.40
Kyrgyzstan	0.28	0.30	0.31	0.38	0.46
Latvia	0.30	0.32	0.34	0.41	0.49
Lithuania	0.28	0.30	0.31	0.38	0.46
Luxembourg	0.22	0.23	0.25	0.30	0.38
Macedonia	0.25	0.26	0.27	0.34	0.42
Moldova	0.20	0.21	0.22	0.28	0.34
Montenegro	0.15	0.16	0.16	0.21	0.26
Netherlands	0.52	0.55	0.57	0.64	0.70
Norway	0.51	0.54	0.56	0.65	0.74
Poland	0.34	0.36	0.38	0.45	0.54
Portugal	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Romania	0.36	0.39	0.40	0.48	0.57
Russia	0.21	0.22	0.24	0.29	0.36
Serbia	0.47	0.49	0.51	0.60	0.69
Slovakia	0.27	0.29	0.30	0.37	0.45
Slovenia	0.51	0.54	0.56	0.65	0.74
Spain	0.46	0.48	0.50	0.59	0.68
Sweden	0.31	0.33	0.35	0.42	0.51
Switzerland	0.36	0.38	0.40	0.47	0.56
Tajikistan	0.22	0.23	0.25	0.30	0.38
Turkey	0.25	0.27	0.29	0.35	0.43
Turkmenistan	0.29	0.31	0.33	0.40	0.48
Ukraine	0.25	0.26	0.28	0.34	0.41
Uzbekistan	0.23	0.24	0.25	0.31	0.39
Iceland*	0.32	0.34	0.36	0.42	0.50
Slovenia*	0.40	0.43	0.44	0.52	0.61

Notes: The table presents the values for the normalized) National Identity Longevity Index for different discount rates. * indicates alternative coding of the National Identity Longevity Index when responses of two experts (for Iceland and Slovenia) who did not elaborate on their definition of national identity (see section Expert responses by polity) are included in the calculation of the value of the index.

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Appendix B

Table B1: Variable definitions, country-level variables

Variable Name	Description	Source
National Identity Longevity Index	Measure of the length of existence of a sense of national identity among the general population. Ranges between 0 and 1. See section Focal explanatory variable for details.	Authors' expert survey
<i>Country-Level Controls</i>		
State Antiquity Index	Measure of the length of statehood as captured by the historic presence of a supra-tribal polity within the present-day boundaries. The scores reflect existence of a government, the proportion of the territory covered, and whether the rule was indigenous or externally imposed. Ranges between 0 and 1, with higher values corresponding to greater state antiquity.	Bockstette et al. (2002), State Antiquity Index Version 3.1
GDP Per Capita	GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international USD)	World Development Indicators 2007
Government Effectiveness	Captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. Score ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better governance.	World Governance Indicators 2007
Socialist	Dummy variable equal to 1 if country was a member of the former socialist bloc and 0 otherwise.	Authors' calculation based on EVS
Gini	Measure of the degree of inequality in the distribution of family income in a country. Ranges between 0 and 100, with higher values corresponding to greater inequality. Any missing Eurostat 2007 observations were linearly interpolated using the CIA World Factbook data.	Eurostat 2007, CIA World Factbook
Ethnic Fractionalization	Measure of ethnic heterogeneity. Computed as one minus the sum of squared ethnic group shares. Reflects the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a population belong to different ethnic groups. Higher values correspond to greater heterogeneity.	Alesina et al. (2003)
Linguistic Fractionalization	Measure of linguistic heterogeneity. Computed as one minus the sum of squared linguistic group shares. Reflects the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a population belong to different linguistic groups. Higher values correspond to greater heterogeneity.	Alesina et al. (2003)
Religious Fractionalization	Measure of linguistic heterogeneity. Computed as one minus the sum of squared religious group shares. Reflects the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a population belong to different religious groups. Higher values correspond to greater heterogeneity.	Alesina et al. (2003)

(continued below)

Table B1 (continued)

Variable Name	Description	Source
WWII Axis Power	Dummy equal to 1 if country was a World War II Axis power and 0 otherwise. WWII Axis Power is coded as 1 for Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Romania, and Slovakia.	The Holocaust Encyclopedia
Democracy	1998-2008 average of the Polity IV measure of democracy	Center for Systemic Peace, INSCR Data Page
Accumulated Democracy	The sum of a country's democracy scores over the country's life span (see Elkins and Sides, 2007: 700)	Center for Systemic Peace, INSCR Data Page
In War 1946-2008	Dummy equal to 1 if country was involved in an interstate armed conflict between 1946 and 2008. In War 1956-2008 is coded as 1 for Albania, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, France, Georgia, Hungary, Netherlands, Russia, Slovenia, and Great Britain.	Armed Conflicts Version 4-2009 database

Table B2: Variable definitions, individual-level controls

Variable Name	Description	Source
Male	Dummy equal to 1 if the responder is male and 0 if female.	EVS 2008, v302
Age A	Dummy equal to 1 if responder's age (in years) is in the interval A and 0 otherwise. $A \in \{19 \text{ or less}; 20 \text{ to } 29; 30 \text{ to } 39; 40 \text{ to } 49; 50 \text{ to } 59; 60 \text{ to } 69; 70 \text{ to } 79; 80 \text{ or more}\}$.	EVS 2008, Age
Education Level E	Dummy equal to 1 if responder's education level equals E and 0 otherwise. $E \in \{1, 2, \dots, 7\}$, where 1 is pre-primary education or none; 2 is primary or first stage of basic; 3 is lower secondary or second stage of basic; 4 is upper-secondary; 5 is post-secondary non-tertiary; 6 is first stage of tertiary; 7 is second stage of tertiary.	EVS 2008, v336
Household Annual Income I	Dummy equal to 1 if responder's reported annual household income is in the interval I and 0 otherwise. $H \in \{1, 2, \dots, 12\}$, where 1 is less than 1,800; 2 is 1,800 to 3,600; 3 is 3,600 to 6,000; 4 is 6,000 to 12,000; 5 is 12,000 to 18,000; 6 is 18,000 to 24,000; 7 is 24,000 to 30,000; 8 is 30,000 to 36,000; 9 is 36,000 to 60,000; 10 is 60,000 to 90,000; 11 is 90,000 to 120,000; 12 is more than 120,000. The amounts are measured in Euros.	EVS 2008, v353YR
Married	Dummy equal to 1 if responder's marital status is married or in registered partnership and 0 otherwise.	EVS 2008, v313
Children	Dummy equal to 1 if responder's number of children is one or more, and 0 otherwise.	EVS 2008, v321
Voter	Dummy equal to 1 if responder indicated that (s)he would vote in a general election.	EVS 2008, v263
Left Political Views	Dummy equal to 1 if responder identified him or herself as being 1, 2 or 3 on the political scale (where 1 is left and 10 is right) and 0 otherwise.	EVS 2008, v193
Center Political Views	Dummy equal to 1 if responder identified him or herself as being 4, 5, 6 or 7 on the political scale (where 1 is left and 10 is right) and 0 otherwise.	EVS 2008, v193
Right Political Views	Dummy equal to 1 if responder identified him or herself as being 8, 9 or 10 on the political scale (where 1 is left and 10 is right) and 0 otherwise.	EVS 2008, v193
Father Immigrant	Dummy equal to 1 if responder's father is an immigrant and 0 otherwise.	EVS 2008, v309
Mother Immigrant	Dummy equal to 1 if responder's mother is an immigrant and 0 otherwise.	EVS 2008, v311
Unemployed	Dummy equal to 1 if responder's employment status is unemployed and 0 otherwise.	EVS 2008, v89
Religious	Dummy equal to 1 if responder identifies as religious and 0 if responder identifies as non-religious or convinced atheist.	EVS 2008, v114
Confidence in Government G	Dummy equal to 1 if responder's level of confidence in government equals G and 0 otherwise. $G \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$, where 1 is none at all; 2 is not very much; 3 is quite a lot; 4 is a great deal.	EVS 2008, v222
Interest in Politics P	Dummy equal to 1 if responder's level of interest in politics equals P and 0 otherwise. $P \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$, where 1 is not at all interested; 2 is not very interested; 3 is somewhat interested; and 4 is very interested.	EVS 2008, v186

Table B3: Descriptive statistics, individual-level variables

Variable Name	No. Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
National Pride	28,178	3.2892	0.7574	1	4
Male	28,178	0.4750	0.4994	0	1
Age 19 or Less	28,178	0.0215	0.1452	0	1
Age 20 to 29	28,178	0.1550	0.3619	0	1
Age 30 to 39	28,178	0.1728	0.3781	0	1
Age 40 to 49	28,178	0.1931	0.3947	0	1
Age 50 to 59	28,178	0.1817	0.3856	0	1
Age 60 to 69	28,178	0.1502	0.3573	0	1
Age 70 to 79	28,178	0.0932	0.2908	0	1
Age 80 or More	28,178	0.0324	0.1770	0	1
Education Level 1	28,178	0.0196	0.1386	0	1
Education Level 2	28,178	0.0669	0.2498	0	1
Education Level 3	28,178	0.1519	0.3589	0	1
Education Level 4	28,178	0.4154	0.4928	0	1
Education Level 5	28,178	0.0645	0.2456	0	1
Education Level 6	28,178	0.2733	0.4457	0	1
Education Level 7	28,178	0.0084	0.0913	0	1
Household Annual Income 1	28,178	0.0848	0.2786	0	1
Household Annual Income 2	28,178	0.0998	0.2998	0	1
Household Annual Income 3	28,178	0.1384	0.3453	0	1
Household Annual Income 4	28,178	0.1830	0.3867	0	1
Household Annual Income 5	28,178	0.1191	0.3239	0	1
Household Annual Income 6	28,178	0.0802	0.2716	0	1
Household Annual Income 7	28,178	0.0713	0.2573	0	1
Household Annual Income 8	28,178	0.0645	0.2456	0	1
Household Annual Income 9	28,178	0.1027	0.3036	0	1
Household Annual Income 10	28,178	0.0388	0.1932	0	1
Household Annual Income 11	28,178	0.0103	0.1008	0	1
Household Annual Income 12	28,178	0.0071	0.0840	0	1
Married	28,178	0.5807	0.4935	0	1
Children	28,178	0.7355	0.4411	0	1
Voter	28,178	0.8462	0.3608	0	1
Left Political Views	28,178	0.2007	0.4005	0	1
Center Political Views	28,178	0.6179	0.4859	0	1
Right Political Views	28,178	0.1815	0.3854	0	1
Father Immigrant	28,178	0.0708	0.2565	0	1
Mother Immigrant	28,178	0.0698	0.2547	0	1
Unemployed	28,178	0.4342	0.4957	0	1
Experienced Prolonged Unemployment	28,178	0.2261	0.4183	0	1
Religious	28,178	0.6699	0.4703	0	1
Confidence in Government 1	28,178	0.2341	0.4235	0	1
Confidence in Government 2	28,178	0.4028	0.4905	0	1
Confidence in Government 3	28,178	0.3093	0.4622	0	1
Confidence in Government 4	28,178	0.0538	0.2256	0	1
Interest in Politics 1	28,178	0.1390	0.3460	0	1
Interest in Politics 2	28,178	0.3194	0.4663	0	1
Interest in Politics 3	28,178	0.4031	0.4906	0	1
Interest in Politics 4	28,178	0.1384	0.3453	0	1

Notes: The table reports descriptive statistics for individual-level variables for the estimating sample used in Tables 2 and 3.

Table B4: Descriptive statistics, country-level variables

Variable Name	No. Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
National Identity Longevity Index	28,178	0.4539	0.1568	0.0829	1
<i>Country-Level Controls</i>					
State Antiquity Index	28,178	0.7087	0.1873	0.3452	1
GDP Per Capita	28,178	29,296.8	14,953.4	3602.6	65,780.9
Government Effectiveness	28,178	0.7939	0.9678	-1.13	2.36
Socialist	28,178	0.5447	0.4980	0	1
Gini	28,178	30.40	4.88	23.20	43.63
Ethnic Fractionalization	28,178	0.2704	0.1764	0.0468	0.6300
Linguistic Fractionalization	28,178	0.2630	0.1954	0.0198	0.6751
Religious Fractionalization	28,178	0.4486	0.1793	0.1438	0.7222
WWII Axis Power	25,054	0.2312	0.4216	0	1
Democracy	25,054	8.79	2.74	-7	10
Accumulated Democracy	25,054	237.7	530.1	-1054	1610
In War 1946-2008	25,054	0.2786	0.4483	0	1

Notes: The table reports descriptive statistics for country-level variables, measured at the individual level, for the estimating samples used in Tables 2 and 3.

Table B5: Pairwise correlation coefficients between key country-level variables

	National Identity Longevity Index	State Antiquity Index	GDP Per Capita	Government Effectiveness	Gini	Socialist	Ethnic Fractionalization	Linguistic Fractionalization	Religious Fractionalization
National Identity Longevity Index	1.0000								
State Antiquity Index	0.4737	1.0000							
GDP Per Capita	0.4746	0.5266	1.0000						
Government Effectiveness	0.4860	0.5318	0.9017	1.0000					
Gini	-0.1004	-0.2027	-0.5762	-0.5581	1.0000				
Socialist	-0.4404	-0.6105	-0.8176	-0.7392	0.3684	1.0000			
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.4951	-0.3442	-0.4891	-0.4347	0.3576	0.4496	1.0000		
Linguistic Fractionalization	-0.4326	-0.2269	-0.2406	-0.2370	0.1444	0.2106	0.8142	1.0000	
Religious Fractionalization	-0.1312	-0.0098	-0.3368	-0.2762	0.1742	0.4008	0.3671	0.4865	1.0000

Notes: The table reports pairwise correlation coefficients between country-level variables for the estimating sample used in Table 2 and parts of Table 3.

Table B6: Average marginal effects of individual-level controls, specification with the full set of controls (see Table 2, Column (11))

Explanatory Variable	Avg. ME
Male	-0.0098 (0.0068)
Age 19 or Less	-0.0350 (0.0296)
Age 20 to 29	-0.0640*** (0.0198)
Age 30 to 39	-0.0673*** (0.0169)
Age 40 to 49	-0.0718*** (0.0167)
Age 50 to 59	-0.0579*** (0.0169)
Age 60 to 69	-0.0442*** (0.0144)
Age 70 to 79	-0.0285** (0.0131)
Education Level 2	-0.0355 (0.03361)
Education Level 3	-0.0912** (0.0392)
Education Level 4	-0.1020*** (0.0378)
Education Level 5	-0.1147*** (0.0386)
Education Level 6	-0.1427*** (0.0441)
Education Level 7	-0.2277*** (0.0513)
Household Annual Income 2	-0.0141 (0.0243)
Household Annual Income 3	-0.0159 (0.0347)
Household Annual Income 4	-0.0247 (0.0351)
Household Annual Income 5	-0.0413 (0.0350)
Household Annual Income 6	-0.0238 (0.0367)
Household Annual Income 7	-0.0348 (0.0368)
Household Annual Income 8	-0.0358 (0.0365)
Household Annual Income 9	-0.0300 (0.0361)
Household Annual Income 10	-0.0187 (0.0374)
Household Annual Income 11	0.0167 (0.0454)
Household Annual Income 12	0.0055 (0.0484)

(Table continued below.)

Table B6 (continued)

Explanatory Variable	Avg. ME
Married	0.0175** (0.0076)
Children	0.0040 (0.0116)
Voter	0.0800*** (0.0107)
Left Political Views	-0.1068*** (0.0194)
Center Political Views	-0.0489*** (0.0130)
Father Immigrant	-0.0587*** (0.0230)
Mother Immigrant	-0.0522*** (0.0210)
Unemployed	0.0247** (0.0119)
Experienced Prolonged Unemployment	-0.0375*** (0.0124)
Religious	0.0698*** (0.0100)
Confidence in Government 2	0.0394*** (0.0113)
Confidence in Government 3	0.1418*** (0.0138)
Confidence in Government 4	0.2491*** (0.0256)
Interest in Politics 2	-0.0187** (0.0098)
Interest in Politics 3	0.0058 (0.0120)
Interest in Politics 4	0.0121 (0.0180)

Notes: The table reports the average marginal effects based on the ordered probit regressions with the full set of controls as featured in Table 2, column (11). Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively, for a two-sided test of significance. Omitted categories are those for which the variables Age 80 or More, Education Level 1, Household Annual Income 1, Right Political Views, Confidence in Government 1, and Interest in Politics 1 take on the value one.

Table B7: Results for Column (10) in Table 3

Explanatory Variables	Average Marginal Effect
National Identity Longevity Index	0.2497** (0.1011)
<i>Individual-Level Controls</i>	Yes
<i>Country-Level Controls as in Column (11) of Table 2</i>	Yes
<i>Further Country-Level Controls</i>	Yes
WWII Axis Power	-0.0935*** (0.0313)
Democracy	0.0025 (0.0034)
Accumulated Democracy	-0.00005 (0.00004)
In War 1946-2008	-0.0111 (0.0269)
No. Obs.	25,054
Pseudo R ²	0.0561

Notes: The table reports the average marginal effects based on the ordered probit regression. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The variables WWII Axis Power, Democracy, Accumulated Democracy, and In War 1956-2008 are defined in Table B1. None of our qualitative results change if in defining the variable In War 1946-2008 we additionally code as 1 the countries that engaged in armed conflict with various external or internal opposition groups. The number of observations is smaller than the 28,178 observations reported in column (11) of Table 2 because of missing values for the variables Democracy and Accumulated Democracy.

References for Appendix B

- Alesina A, Devleeschauwer A, Easterly W, Kurlat S, and Wacziarg R (2003) Fractionalization. *Journal of Economic Growth* 8(2): 155-194.
- Elkins Z and Sides J (2007) Can institutions build unity in multiethnic states? *American Political Science Review* 101(4): 693-708.